We adopt the largest consistent set de…ned by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable in games with positive spillovers. We also introduce a re…nement, the largest cautious consistent set. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the e¢cient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set.
Introduction
Many social, economic and political activities are conducted by groups or coalitions of individuals. For example, consumption takes place within households or families; production is carried out by …rms which are large coalitions of owners of di¤erent factors of production; workers are organized in trade unions or professional associations; public goods are produced within a complex coalition structure of federal, state, and local jurisdictions; political life is conducted through political parties and interest groups; and individuals belong to networks of formal and informal social clubs.
The formation of coalitions has been a major topic in game theory, and has been studied mainly using the framework of cooperative games in coalitional form (see Aumann and Drèze, 1974) . Unfortunately, externalities among coalitions cannot be considered within such framework (see Bloch, 1997) . As a consequence, the formation of coalitions has been described in the recent years as noncooperative simultaneous or sequential games, which are usually solved using the Nash equilibrium concept or one of its re…nements. The most disturbing feature of simultaneous coalition formation games is that the agents cannot be farsighted in the sense that individual deviations cannot be countered by subsequent deviations (see Hart and Kurz, 1983) . In order to remedy this weakness sequential coalition formation games have been proposed (see Bloch, 1996) . Nevertheless, these sequential games are quite sensitive to the exact coalition formation process and rely on the commitment assumption. Once some agents have agreed to form a coalition they are committed to remain in that coalition. They can neither leave the coalition nor propose to change the coalition at subsequent stages.
Coalition formation games in e¤ectivity form as in Chwe (1994) specify what each coalition can do if and when it forms. This representation of games allows us to study economic and social activities where the rules of the game are rather amorphous or the procedures are rarely pinned down (e.g. in sequential bargaining or coalition formation without a rigid protocol), and for which classical game theory could lead to a solution which relies heavily on an arbitrarily chosen procedure or rule. For games in e¤ectivity form where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agreements and actions are public, Chwe (1994) has proposed an interesting solution concept, the largest consistent set. This solution concept predicts which coalitions structures are possibly stable and could emerge. Chwe's approach has a number of nice features. Firstly, it does not rely on a very detailed description of the coalition formation process as noncooperative sequential games do. No commitment assumption is imposed. Secondly, it incorporates the farsightedness of the coalitions. A coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on without limit. However, the largest consistent set su¤ers from a number of drawbacks, some of them pointed out by Chwe himself. For instance, the largest consistent set may fail to satisfy the requirement of individual rationality. An individual that is given the choice between two moves, where one yields with certainty a higher payo¤ than the other, might choose the move leading to the lower payo¤ according to the largest consistent set. This is perhaps somewhat less disturbing than it seems at …rst sight, since the largest consistent set aims to be a weak concept, a concept that rules out with con…dence, but is not so good at picking out. The largest consistent set may also fail to satisfy the requirement of cautiousness.
Hence, we introduce a re…nement, called the largest cautious consistent set.
Two di¤erent notions of a coalitional deviation or move can be found in the gametheoretic literature. Strict deviation: a group of players or a coalition can deviate only if each of its members can be made better o¤. Weak deviation: a group of players or a coalition can deviate only if at least one of its members is better o¤ while all other members are at least as well o¤. A weak deviation or move requires only one player to be better o¤ as long as all other members of the group are not worse o¤, whereas under a strict deviation or move, all deviating players must be better o¤. We shall distinguish between the indirect strict dominance relation and the indirect weak dominance relation in the de…nition of the largest (cautious) consistent set. The indirect strict (weak) dominance relation captures the fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end coalition structure that their move(s) may lead to, and that only strict (weak) deviations or moves will be engaged.
We …nd that the largest (cautious) consistent set is sensitive to the exact de…nition of the indirect dominance relation. In general there is no relationship between the largest (cautious) consistent set based on the indirect strict dominance and the largest (cautious) consistent set based on the indirect weak dominance. The largest consistent set is never empty whenever the set of coalition structures is …nite. Unfortunately, the largest cautious consistent set might be empty in some situations.
However, we show that the largest cautious consistent set re…nes considerably the largest consistent set in coalition formation games satisfying the properties of positive spillovers, negative association, individual free-riding incentives and e¢ciency of the grand coalition. Positive spillovers restrict the analysis to games where the formation of a coalition by other players increases the payo¤ of a player. Negative association imposes that, in any coalition structure, small coalitions have higher per-member payo¤s than big coalitions. Individual free-riding incentives assume that a player becomes better o¤ leaving any coalition to be alone. An economic situation satisfying these properties is a cartel formation game under Cournot competition. Public goods coalitions satisfy these properties under some conditions. We show that many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set in coalition formation games satisfying the four properties imposed on the payo¤s. The grand coalition always belongs to the largest consistent set. The stand-alone coalition structure (where all players are singletons) is never stable under the largest consistent set based on the indirect weak dominance relation. However, the largest cautious consistent set singles out the grand coalition, which is the e¢cient coalition structure.
The paper has been organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations, primitives and de…nitions of indirect dominance. We present the solution concepts of Chwe (1994) , and we propose a re…nement, the largest cautious consistent set. In Section 3 we use the above mentioned concepts to predict which coalition structures are stable in coalition formation with positive spillovers. In Section 4 we analyze and characterize the stable outcomes in the cartel formation game. We also introduce a congestion or monitoring cost and we discuss the role of monitoring costs in the determination of largest consistent sets. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Farsighted Coalitional Stability
The players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members share the coalition gains from cooperation. Let P be the …nite set of coalition structures. A coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m g is a partition of the player set N = f1; 2; :::; ng, S i \ S j = ; for i 6 = j and S m i=1 S i = N . Let jS i j be the cardinality of coalition S i . Gains from cooperation are described by a valuation V which maps the set of coalition structures P into vectors of payo¤s in R n . The component V i (P ) denotes the payo¤ obtained by player i if the coalition structure P is formed.
How the coalition formation proceeds? What coalitions can do if and when they form is speci…ed by f! S g SµN;S6 =; , where f! S g, S µ N, is an e¤ectiveness relation on P. For any P; P 0 2 P, P ! S P 0 means that if the coalition structure P is the status-quo, coalition S can make the coalition structure P 0 the new status-quo. After S deviates to P 0 from P , coalition S 0 might move to P 00 where P 0 ! S 0 P 00 , etc. All actions are public. If a statusquo P is reached and no coalition decides to move from P , then P is a stable coalition structure. A coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form G is (N; P; V; f! S g SµN;S6 =; ).
Indirect Strict or Weak Dominance
As Konishi et al. (1999) A weak deviation or move requires only one player to be better o¤ as long as all other members of the group are not worse o¤, whereas under a strict deviation or move, all deviating players must be better o¤. Hence, we shall distinguish between the indirect strict dominance relation and the indirect weak dominance relation.
The indirect strict dominance relation captures the fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end coalition structure that their move(s) may lead to, and that only strict deviations or moves will be engaged. A coalition structure P 0 indirectly strictly dominates
can replace P in a sequence of moves, such that at each move all deviators are better o¤ at the end coalition structure P 0 compared to the status-quo they face. Formally, indirect strict dominance is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 A coalition structure P is indirectly strictly dominated by P 0 , or P ¿ P 0 , if there exists a sequence P 0 ; P 1 ; :::; P m (where P 0 = P and P m = P 0 ) and a sequence S 0 ; S 1 ; :::; S m¡1 such that
) for all i 2 S j , for j = 0; 1; ::; m ¡
1.
Direct strict dominance is obtained by setting m = 1 in De…nition 1. A coalition structure P is directly strictly dominated by P 0 , or P < P 0 , if there exists a coalition S
The de…nition of the indirect strict dominance relation ¿ is traditional: it is customary to require that a coalition will deviate or move only if all of its members are made better o¤ at the end coalition structure, since changing the status-quo is costly, and players have to be compensated for doing so.
But sometimes some players may be indi¤erent between the status-quo they face and a possible end coalition structure, while others are better o¤ at this end coalition structure.
Then, it should not be too di¢cult for the players who are better o¤ at this end coalition structure to convince the indi¤erent players to join them to move towards this end coalition structure. The indirect weak dominance relation captures this idea. A coalition structure P 0 indirectly weakly dominates P if P 0 can replace P in a sequence of moves, such that at each move all deviators are at least as well o¤ at the end coalition structure P 0 compared to the status-quo they face, and at least one deviator is better o¤ at P 0 . Formally, indirect weak dominance is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2 A coalition structure P is indirectly weakly dominated by P 0 , or P ¿ P 0 , if there exists a sequence P 0 ; P 1 ; :::; P m (where P 0 = P and P m = P 0 ) and a sequence S 0 ; S 1 ; :::; S m¡1 such that P j ! S j P j+1 , V i (P 0 )¸V i (P j ) for all i 2 S j , and V i (P 0 ) > V i (P j ) for some i 2 S j , for j = 0; 1; ::; m ¡ 1.
Direct weak dominance is obtained by setting m = 1 in De…nition 2. A coalition structure P is directly weakly dominated by P 0 , or P < P 0 , if there exists a coalition S
Obviously, if P < P 0 then P ¿ P 0 . Also, if P is indirectly strictly dominated by P 0 , then P is indirectly weakly dominated by P 0 . Of course the reverse is not true. To summarize, we have P < P 0 ) P < P 0 ) P ¿ P 0
The Largest Consistent Set
Based on the indirect strict dominance relation, the largest consistent set due to Chwe (1994) is de…ned as follows. A set Y µ P is consistent if P 2 Y if and only if 8 P
0
; S such that P ! S P 0 , 9 P 00 2 Y , where P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 , such that we do not have
) for all i 2 S. The largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿) is the consistent set such that if Y µ P is consistent then Y µ LCS(G; ¿). Although there can be many consistent sets, Chwe (1994) has shown that there uniquely exists a largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿), which contains all others. The largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿) can also be de…ned in an iterative way as in Chwe (1994) . De…nition 3 Let Y 0´P . Then, Y k (k = 1; 2; :::) is inductively de…ned as follows:
, where P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 , such that we do not have
is stable (at step k) and belongs to Y k , if all possible deviations are deterred. Consider a deviation from P to P 0 by coalition S. There might be further deviations which end up at P 00 , where P 0 ¿ P 00 . There might not be any further deviations, in which case the end coalition structure P 00 = P
. In any case, the end coalition structure P 00 should itself be stable (at step k¡1), and so, should belong to Y k¡1 .
If some member of coalition S is worse o¤ or equal o¤ at P 00 compared to the original coalition structure P , then the deviation is deterred. Since P is …nite, there exists m 2 N such that Y k = Y k+1 for all k¸m, and Y m is the largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿). If a coalition structure is not in the largest consistent set, it cannot be stable. The largest consistent set is the set of all coalition structures which can be possibly stable.
We de…ne in a similar way the largest consistent set based on the indirect weak dominance relation. A set Y µ P is consistent if P 2 Y if and only if 8 P 0 ; S such that P ! S P 0 , 9 P 00 2 Y , where
, such that we do not have
) for all i 2 S and V i (P ) < V i (P 00 ) for some i 2 S. The largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿) is the consistent set such that if Y µ P is consistent then Y µ LCS (G; ¿). The proof of Chwe (1994) can be easily adapted to show that there uniquely exists a largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿). The largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿) can also be rede…ned in an iterative way.
De…nition 4 Let Y

0´P
. Then, Y k (k = 1; 2; :::) is inductively de…ned as follows:
belongs to Y k if and only if 8 P 0 ; S such that P ! S P 0 , 9 P 00 2 Y k¡1 , where
; such that we do not have
) for all i 2 S and
That is, a coalition structure P 2 Y k¡1 is stable (at step k) and belongs to Y k , if all possible deviations are deterred. Consider a deviation from P to P 0 by coalition S. There might be further deviations which end up at P 00 , where P 0 ¿ P 00 . There might not be any further deviations, in which case the end coalition structure P 00 = P
0
. In any case, the end coalition structure P 00 should itself be stable (at step k ¡ 1), and so, should belong to Y k¡1 . If some member of coalition S is worse o¤ or all members of S are equal o¤ at P 00 compared to the original coalition structure P , then the deviation is deterred. Since P is …nite, there exists m 2 N such that Y k = Y k+1 for all k¸m, and Y m is the largest consistent set LCS (G; ¿).
The following example shows that the largest consistent set is sensitive to the exact de…nition of the indirect dominance relation. Figure 1 depicts a three-player coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form, where only three coalition structures are feasible:
f12; 3g, f1; 2; 3g and f1; 23g. The payo¤ vectors associated with those three partitions are given in Figure 1 as well as the possible moves from each partition. For instance, player
(1; 1; 0) (2; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0) f1g f2; 3g Figure 1 . The largest consistent set is sensitive to the indirect dominance relation.
The Largest Cautious Consistent Set
Similarly to the rationalizability concepts, 1 f123g, f1; 23g and f1; 2; 3g. The payo¤ vectors associated with those three partitions are given in Figure 2 as well as the possible moves from each partition. For instance, player 1 can move from f123g where he gets 1 to f1; 23g where he gets 2. We have f123g < f1; 23g and f1; 23g < f1; 23g. It follows that LCS (G; ¿) = LCS (G; ¿) = ff123g; f1; 2; 3gg.
But player 1 cannot end worse o¤ by engaging a move from f123g compared to what he gets in f123g.
(1; 0; 0) (2; 0; 0) (1; 2; 1) f1g f2g Figure 2 . The largest consistent set is not consistent with cautiousness.
To give sharper predictions we propose to re…ne the largest consistent set. Applying the spirit of some re…nements of the rationalizability concept to the largest consistent set leads to the following de…nition of the largest cautious consistent set derived from either the indirect strict dominance relation or the indirect weak dominance relation. Formally, the largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G; ¿) based on the indirect strict dominance is de…ned in an iterative way.
:::) is inductively de…ned as follows:
, where P 0 = P j or P 0 ¿ P j , such that we do not have
1 See Bernheim (1984), Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999) , Pearce (1984) .
The largest cautious consistent set LCCS
The idea behind the largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G; ¿) is that once a coalition S deviates from P to P 0 , this coalition S should contemplate the possibility to end with positive probability at any coalition structure P 00 not ruled out 2 and such that P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 . Hence, a coalition structure P is never stable if a coalition S can engage a deviation from P to P 0 and doing so there is no risk that some coalition members will end worse o¤ or equal o¤.
The de…nition, based on the indirect weak dominance, of the largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G; ¿) is as follows.
. Then, Z k (k = 1; 2; :::) is inductively de…ned as follows:
, that gives positive weight to each P j 2 Z k¡1 , where
) for all i 2 S, and
The largest cautious consistent set
Once a coalition S deviates from P to P 0 , this coalition S should contemplate the possibility to end with positive probability at any coalition structure P 00 not ruled out and such that P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P
00
. Hence, a coalition structure P is never stable if a coalition S can engage a deviation from P to P 0 and doing so some coalition members will be better o¤ but there is no risk that some coalition members will end worse o¤.
Obviously, the largest cautious consistent set is a re…nement of the largest consistent set.
Theorem 1 LCCS (G; ¿) µ LCS (G; ¿) and LCCS (G; ¿) µ LCS (G; ¿).
Proof. It su¢ces to show that Z k µ Y k for all k. We prove this by induction on k. For
2 On the contrary, in the largest consistent set once a coalition S deviates from P to P 0 , this coalition S only contemplates the possibility to end with probability one at a coalition structure P 00 not ruled out and such that P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 .
Unfortunately, the largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G; ¿) or LCCS (G; ¿) might be empty in some situations. In general there is no relationship between LCCS (G; ¿) and LCCS (G; ¿). In the example of Figure 1 , we have LCCS (G; ¿) = ff1; 2; 3g; f1; 23gg and LCCS (G; ¿) = ff12; 3g; f1; 23gg. Nevertheless, we will show that the largest cautious consistent set re…nes considerably the largest consistent set in coalition formation games with positive spillovers (and that, both sets LCS (G; ¿) and LCS (G; ¿) coincide).
The following example (see Figure 3) illustrates that the largest cautious consistent set LCCS (G; ¿) or LCCS (G; ¿) might be empty, while the largest consistent set Figure 3 depicts a three-player coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form. The payo¤ vectors associated with the partitions are given in Figure 3 as well as the possible moves from each partition. For instance, the coalition of players 2 and 3 can move from f13; 2g where they get respectively (1; 1) to f1; 23g
where they get (0; 0). We have f123g < f12; 3g, f1; 2; 3g < f13; 2g, f1; 23g < f12; 3g, f123g ¿ f13; 2g, but also f12; 3g ¿ f13; 2g and f13; 2g ¿ f12; 3g. It follows that
Indeed, it is intuitively reasonable that no outcome can be possibly cautiously stable in this example. Player 1 or the coalition formed by players 2 and 3 cannot end worse o¤ by engaging a move from f12; 3g and f13; 2g, respectively. One condition on the game G in e¤ectivity form which guarantees that the largest cautious consistent set is nonempty is that the coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form is acyclic.
De…nition 7 A coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form G is acyclic if the e¤ec-tiveness relation, f! S g SµN , is such that there does not exist a sequence P 0 ; P 1 ; :::; P m (where P 0 = P and P m = P ) and a sequence S 0 ; S 1 ; :::; S m¡1 such that P j ! S j P j+1 , for j = 0; 1; ::; m ¡ 1.
Theorem 2 If the coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form G is acyclic, then the sets LCCS (G; ¿) and LCCS (G; ¿) are nonempty.
Proof. Since P is …nite and G is acyclic, there exists P 2 P such that there does not exist P 0 2 P and S µ N such that P ! S P 0 . In other words P is an end coalition structure from which no move is possible. Hence, P belongs to LCCS (G; ¿) and LCCS (G; ¿).
3 Coalition Formation with Positive Spillovers
Conditions on the Payo¤s
Gains are assumed to be positive, V i (P ) > 0 for all i 2 N , for all P 2 P. We assume symmetric or identical players and equal sharing of the coalition gains among coalition members. 3 That is, in any coalition S i belonging to P , V j (P ) = V l (P ) for all j; l 2 S i , i = 1; :::; m. So, let V (S i ; P ) denote the payo¤ obtained by any player belonging to S i in the coalition structure P . We focus on coalition formation games satisfying the following conditions on the per-member payo¤s.
Condition (P.1) restricts our analysis to games with positive spillovers, where the formation of a coalition by other players increases the payo¤ of a player.
(P.2) Negative Association. V (S i ; P ) < V (S j ; P ) if and only if jS i j > jS j j.
Condition (P.2) imposes that, in any coalition structure, small coalitions have higher per-member payo¤s than big coalitions.
Condition (P.3) is related to the existence of individual free-riding incentives. That is, if a player leaves any coalition to be alone, then he is better o¤.
(P.4) E¢ciency. @ P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m g 2 P such that P 6 = fNg and
Finally, condition (P.4) assumes that the grand coalition is the only e¢cient coalition structure with respect to payo¤s, where V (N) denotes the payo¤ of any player belonging to the grand coalition fNg.
An economic situation satisfying these four conditions is a cartel formation game with Cournot competition as in Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997) . Let p (q) = a ¡ q be the inverse demand (q is the industry output). The industry consists of jNj identical …rms. Inside each cartel, we assume equal sharing of the bene…ts obtained from the cartel's production.
Once
where jP j is the number of cartels within P . A second economic application of games with positive spillovers are economies with pure public goods. The model we study is inspired from Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997) wherein we introduce congestion. The economy consists of jNj agents. At cost d i (q i ), agent i can provide q i units of the public good. Let q = P i q i be the total amount of public good. The utility each agent obtains from the public good depends positively on the total amount of public good provided, but negatively on the number of coalition partners: U i (q) = (jSj) ¡® ¢ q for all i 2 S, where parameter ® > 0 measures the degree of congestion. Each agent owns a technology to produce the public good, and the cost of producing the amount q i of the public good is given by
. Since individual cost functions are convex and exhibit decreasing returns to scale, it is cheaper to produce an amount q of public goods using all technologies than using a single technology. In stage one the coalition formation takes place. Inside each coalition, we assume equal sharing of the production. Once stable agreements on coalition formation have been reached, each coalition of agents acts noncooperatively. On the contrary, inside every coalition, agents act cooperatively and the level of public good is chosen to maximize the sum of utilities of the coalition members. That is, for any coalition structure P = fS 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S m g, the level of public good q i chosen by the coalition S i solves
yielding a total level of public good provision for the coalition S i equal to q i = (jS i j) 2¡® , i = 1; :::; m. The per-member payo¤ in a coalition of size jS i j is given by
for all agents belonging to S i , i = 1; :::; m.
Contrary to the cartel formation game with Cournot competition, it depends on the number of agents jN j and the degree of congestion ® whether public goods coalitions satisfy conditions (P1)-(P4). For instance, public goods coalitions with utility function
. Notice that, for jNj < 4 the condition (P.3) is violated, while for jN j > 10 it is (P.4) which is violated.
The E¤ectiveness Relation
Remember that what coalitions can do if and when they form is speci…ed by f! S g SµN;S6 =; , where f! S g, S µ N , is an e¤ectiveness relation on P. Restrictions are imposed on the coalition formation process in G through the e¤ectiveness relation f! S g which is de…ned as follows: P ! S P 0 if and only if (i) fS i n (S i \ S) : S i 2 P g = fS 0 i 2 P 0 : S 0 i µ N n Sg and (ii) 9fS in P , the non-deviating players do not move. Nevertheless, once S has moved, the players not in S can react to the deviation of S. Condition (ii) simply allows the deviating players in S to form one or several coalitions in the new status-quo P 0 . Non-deviating players do not belong to those new coalitions.
Stable Coalition Structures
Before stating the results, we introduce some de…nitions or notations. A coalition structure P is symmetric if and only if jS i j = jS j j for all S i ; S j 2 P . We denote by P ¤ = fNg the grand coalition (P ¤ is a symmetric coalition structure) and by P the stand-alone coalition structure: P = fS 1 ; :::; S n g with jS i j = 1 for all S i 2 P .
The following two lemmas partially characterize the largest consistent set for the coalition formation game in e¤ectivity form G under conditions (P.1)-(P.4). Lemma 2 states that any coalition structure, wherein some coalition members would receive less than in the stand-alone coalition structure, is never stable.
Lemma 2 Under (P.1)-(P.4), if there exists S 2 P such that V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ), then P = 2 LCS (G; ¿) and P = 2 LCS (G; ¿).
Proof. Condition (P.2) implies that in any coalition structure P , V (S i ; P ) < V (S j ; P ) if and only if jS i j > jS j j. To prove Lemma 2, we proceed by steps.
Step one. Firstly, we show that all coalition structures P 2 P containing only one coalition S with jSj > 1 and V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ), do not belong to LCS (G; ¿) and LCS (G; ¿). Obviously, P < P and the deviation P ! S P cannot be deterred. Indeed, any deviation from P of players that did not belong to S in P will improve, by (P.1), the payo¤ of players that were in S (in P ) and are singletons in P . Therefore, P = 2 LCS (G; ¿) and P = 2 LCS (G; ¿).
Step two. Secondly, we show that all coalition structures P 2 P containing only two coalitions S 1 ; S 2 with jS 1 j¸jS 2 j > 1 and V (S 1 ; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ), do not belong to LCS (G; ¿) and LCS (G; ¿). Condition (P.1) implies that the coalition S 1 has incentives to split into singletons. Indeed, V (S 1 ; P 0 ) > V (S 0 ; P ) and P < P 0 where
-if V (S 2 ; P 0 ) < V (S 0 ; P ), then using the argumentation of step one, the deviation P 0 ! S2 P is not deterred and P À P . Therefore, P = 2 LCS (G; ¿) and P = 2 LCS (G; ¿). -if V (S 2 ; P 0 ) > V (S 0 ; P ), we have to show that any deviation from P 0 of players in NnS 1 will never make players in S 1 worse o¤ than in P . Two kinds of deviations are possible. First, the players in S 2 form a bigger coalition with players not in S 1 . Then, by condition (P.1), the players in S 1 that now are singletons obtain a payo¤ even greater than in P 0 . Second, some player(s) leave(s) S 2 to form singleton(s). Then, the players that were in S 1 are worse than in P 0 but, by (P.1), they are better o¤ or at least not worse o¤ than in P , and V (S 1 ; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ). Therefore, there is no other coalition structure P 00 such that P 00 À P 0 and V (fjg; P 00 ) < V (S 1 ; P ) for some j 2 S 1 . Hence, P = 2 LCS (G; ¿) and P = 2 LCS (G; ¿).
Step three. Thirdly, proceeding as above, we can show that all coalition structures P 2 P containing only three coalitions S 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 with jS 1 j¸jS 2 j¸jS 3 j > 1 and V (S 1 ; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ), do not belong to LCS (G; ¿) and LCS (G; ¿). And so on.
The grand coalition structure which is the e¢cient one always belongs to the largest consistent set, and is possibly stable.
Lemma 3 Under (P.1)-(P.4), P
¤ 2 LCS (G; ¿) and P ¤ 2 LCS (G; ¿).
Proof. To prove that P ¤ 2 Y k (k¸1) we have to show that for all P 6 = P ¤ we have P
That is, we show that P ¤ could be stable since any deviation P ¤ ! S P can be deterred by the threat of ending in P ¤ . The proof is done in two steps.
Step A. By (P.2) and (P.4) the players belonging to the biggest coalition (in size) in any P 6 = P ¤ are worse than in P
¤
. Also, all players prefer P ¤ to P , and P ¤ > P .
Step B. Take the sequence of moves where at each move one player belonging to the biggest coalition (in the current coalition structure) deviates to form a singleton, until the coalition structure P is reached. From P occurs the deviation P ! N P ¤ .
Therefore, (A)-(B) imply that P ¤ À P for all P 6 = P ¤ .
From these two lemmas, we obtain a su¢cient condition such that the largest consistent set singles out the grand coalition.
Proposition 1 Under (P.1)-(P.4), if each non-symmetric coalition structure P 2 P is such that there exists S 2 P satisfying V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ), then LCS (G; ¿) = fP ¤ g and
Proof. Lemma 2 tells us that coalition structures P 2 P, where 9 S 2 P such that V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ), do not belong to LCS (G; ¿) and LCS (G; ¿). So, Y 1 µ PnfP 2 P : 9S 2 P for which V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P )g. The conditions (P.2) and (P.4) imply that all symmetric coalition structures P (6 = P ¤ ) are such that V (S i ; P ) = V (S j ; P ) and V (N) > V (S i ; P ) for all S i ; S j 2 P (it implies that P ¤ > P for all P (6 = P ¤ ) symmetric). So, the deviation P ! N P ¤ (where P symmetric) cannot be deterred since @P 0 such that
We now show that the stand-alone coalition structure, i.e. the coalition structure consisting only of singletons, is never stable under the largest consistent set based on the indirect weak dominance relation.
Proof. From De…nition 4 and Lemma 2, we have that Y 0´P and Y 1 = fP 2 P : 8P 0 ; S such that P ! S P 0 , 9P 00 2 Y 0 , where P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 , we do not have
) for all i 2 S and V i (¢; P ) < V i (¢; P
00
) for some i 2 Sg µ PnfP 2 P : 9 S 2 P for which V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P )g. Next we show that P = 2 Y 2 = fP 2 P : 8P 0 ; S such that
, where P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P
, we do not have V i (¢; P ) · V i (¢; P
) for all i 2 S and V i (¢; P ) < V i (¢; P 00 ) for some i 2 Sg. Any coalition structure P 2 Y 1 is such that 8S 2 P : V (S; P )¸V (S 0 ; P ). By (P.2) and (P.4), the coalition structure P ¤ = fN g is e¢cient and V (N) > V (S 0 ; P ) for all i 2 N. Therefore, P = 2 Y 2 because the deviation
, where P ¤ = P 00 or P ¤ ¿ P
, we have V i (¢; P ) · V i (¢; P 00 ) for all i 2 N and V i (¢; P ) < V i (¢; P 00 ) for some i 2 N , by (P.1).
However, this results does not hold when we consider the de…nition of the largest consistent set based on the indirect strict dominance relation. The stand-alone coalition structure, P , may belong to LCS (G; ¿). , we eliminate the coalition structures f2; 1; 1g and f1; 1; 1; 1g. Indeed, the deviations f2; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 1g and f1; 1; 1; 1g ! f4g are not deterred. In the second round, we cannot eliminate other coalition structures since any possible deviations from f4g or f3; 1g or f2; 2g are deterred.
Then, LCS(G; ¿) = ff4g ; f3; 1g ; f2; 2gg. Secondly, we characterize LCS(G; ¿). We can only eliminate the coalition structure f2; 1; 1g. The deviation f1; 1; 1; 1g ! f4g is deterred by the move from f4g to f3; 1g. The deviation f1; 1; 1; 1g ! f2; 2g is deterred by the sequence of moves from f2; 2g to f2; 1; 1g to f1; 1; 1; 1g to f4g to f3; 1g. Then, LCS(G; ¿) = ff4g ; f3; 1g ; f2; 2g; f1; 1; 1; 1gg.
Cautiously Stable Coalition Structures
In most economic situations satisfying the conditions (P.1)-(P.4), many coalition structures belong to the largest consistent set. Indeed, the largest consistent set aims to be a weak concept which rules out with con…dence. On the contrary, the largest cautious consistent set aims to be better at picking out. The largest cautious consistent set singles out the grand coalition.
Proof. From De…nition 6 we have Z 0 = P.
Step one. From Lemma 2 and De…nition 6, it is straightforward that the set of coalition structures fP 2 P : 9 S 2 P such that V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P )g does not belong to Z 1 . On the contrary, we can see that P ¤ 2 Z 1 . Consider …rst any possible deviation of any coalition S to any coalition structure P containing only coalitions S with V (S; P ) > V (S 0 ; P ), and such that P > P ¤ . By (P.2) and (P.4) the players belonging to the biggest coalition (in size) in any P 2 PnfP ¤ g are worse than in P ¤ . From P , take the sequence of moves where, at each move, one of the players of the biggest coalition in size deviates to form a singleton, until we arrive to P . From P occurs the deviation to some coalition structure P 0 which is a permutation of players in P (that is, jP j = jP 0 j and 8S 2 P , there exists a coalition S 0 2 P 0 such that jSj = jS 0 j), and such that the initial player who has deviated from P is occupying now in P 0 the position of some player i belonging to the coalition S that, initially, has moved from P ¤ to P . This means that P 0 À P and at least one of the initial deviating players of coalition S from P ¤ (player i) is worse o¤ in P 0 compared to
. Therefore, every possible deviation from P ¤ to some coalition structure P with all S 2 P such that V (S; P ) > V (S 0 ; P ), is deterred because there always exists a coalition structure P 0 , with P 0 À P and such that V (¢; P 0 ) < V (¢; P ¤ ) for some player i 2 S and P ¤ ! S P . Finally, we have to consider any possible deviation of some coalition S from P ¤ to P with P > P ¤ and such that for some S 00 2 P we have V (S 00 ; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ). If such a deviation does exist, it will be deterred because P À P and all i 2 N get a payo¤ V (¢; P ) < V (¢; P ¤ ). Then, P ¤ 2 Z 1 , and Z 1 µ PnfP 2 P : 9 S 2 P such that
Step two. Take the coalition structure P and any other coalition structure P 2 Z 1 µ PnfP 2 P : 9 S 2 P such that V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P )g containing some coalition S that obtains a payo¤ V (S; P ) = V (S 0 ; P ). Obviously, P and P do not belong to Z 2 since for all P 0 ; S such that P ! S P 0 or P ! S P 0 , the expected payo¤ obtained by assigning positive probabilities to all coalition structures P 00 2 Z 1 , with at least P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 , is strictly preferred to V (S; P ) for all players in S, given that P ¤ À P 0 for all P 0 2 P and V (¢; P ) < V (¢; P ¤ ). Using the same reasoning as in step one, one can show that
Step three. Take the coalition structure(s) P 2 Z 2 containing the coalition S that obtains the smallest payo¤. Obviously, P does not belong to Z 3 since for all P 0 ; S such that P ! S P 0 , the expected payo¤ obtained by assigning positive probabilities to all coalition structures P 00 2 Z 2 , with P 0 = P 00 or P 0 ¿ P 00 , is strictly preferred to V (S; P ) for all players in S, given that P ¤ À P 0 for all P 0 2 P, and V (S; P ) < V (¢; P ¤ ) for all i 2 S (the deviating coalition). One can use the same reasoning used in step one to show that P ¤ 2 Z 3 . And so on, until we have eliminated all P 2 PnfP ¤ g (given that, by (P.2) and (P.4), the players belonging to the biggest coalition (in size) in any P 2 PnfP ¤ g are worse than in P ¤ ). Now, consider P ¤ . From Lemma 3, we know that for all P 6 = P ¤ , P ¿ P ¤ . Then,
the expected payo¤ obtained by assigning positive probability to P ¤ (the only coalition structure not yet eliminated in the iterative procedure described above) and with
, is equally preferred to the payo¤ obtained in P ¤ for all i 2 S (the initial devi-
This result is due to the basic idea behind the largest cautious consistent set. Intuitively, at each iteration in the de…nition of the largest cautious consistent set, we rule out the coalition structure wherein some players receive less or equal than what they could obtain in all candidates to be stable (i.e. all coalition structures not ruled out yet) since these players cannot end worse o¤ by engaging a move. In the …rst round of the iterative procedure to compute the largest consistent set, we eliminate the coalition structures f1; 1; 1; 1g and f2; 1; 1g. Indeed, the deviations f1; 1; 1; 1g ! f4g and f2; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 1g are not deterred. In the second round, we cannot eliminate other coalition structures since any possible deviations from f4g or f3; 1g or f2; 2g are deterred. For example, the deviation f3; 1g ! f2; 1; 1g by one of the player who obtains 4:72 as payo¤ is deterred since there exists a sequence of moves f2; 1; 1g ! f4g ! f3; 1g ending at f3; 1g such that at each move the deviating players prefer the ending coalition structure to the status-quo they face and the original deviating player is not better o¤ (he obtains still 4:72 as payo¤). Therefore, the largest consistent set is LCS(G; ¿) = ff4g ; f3; 1g ; f2; 2gg.
But f3; 1g and f2; 2g do not belong to the largest cautious consistent set. Indeed, the deviation f3; 1g ! f2; 1; 1g by one of the player who obtains 4:72 as payo¤ is not deterred since all coalition structures that indirectly dominate f2; 1; 1g
and not yet eliminated are f4g, f3; 1g and f2; 2g. Hence, the expected payo¤ of the original deviating player, obtained by assigning positive probabilities to f4g, f3; 1g and f2; 2g, is greater than 4:72.
Once f3; 1g is eliminated, the deviation f2; 2g ! f4g is not deterred. Therefore, f3; 1g and f2; 2g do not belong to the largest cautious consistent set which singles out f4g.
Cartel Formation with Quantity Competition
In the cartel formation game with Cournot competition, the largest consistent set based on the indirect weak dominance relation singles out for jN j · 4 the grand coalition P ¤ = fNg.
But as jNj grows, many coalition structures may belong to LCS(G; ¿). In the …rst round of the iterative procedure to compute the largest consistent set, we eliminate the coalition structures f2; 1; 1; 1; 1g, f3; 1; 1; 1g, f4; 1; 1g. The deviations f2; 1; 1; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g, f3; 1; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g, f4; 1; 1g ! f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g are not deterred. Also, we can eliminate f2; 2; 1; 1g: the deviation f2; 2; 1; 1g ! f2; 1; 1; 1; 1g
is not deterred. In the second round, we delete the coalition structure f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g: the deviation f1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ! f3; 3g is not deterred. No more coalition structures can be eliminated at the next rounds. For example, the deviation from f2; 2; 2g to f6g is deterred by the further deviation to f5; 1g. Therefore, ff6g, f5; 1g, f4; 2g, f3; 3g, f3; 2; 1g, f2; 2; 2gg is the largest consistent set LCS(G; ¿). The sum of the payo¤s associated to coalition structures f6g, f5; 1g, f2; 2; 2g are :2502, :222, :1872, respectively.
We now turn to the characterization of the largest consistent set for jNj · 10.
Proposition 4
In the cartel formation game under Cournot competition, LCS(G; ¿) = fP ¤ g for jN j · 4, and LCS(G; ¿) = P n ffP g [ fP 2 P : 9S 2 P such that V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P )gg for 5 · jNj · 10.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix. Some remarks can be made. Firstly, P ¤ always belongs to the largest consistent set LCS(G; ¿) (see Lemma 3), while P never belongs to LCS(G; ¿) (see Proposition 2). Secondly, for 10¸jN j¸5, all symmetric coalition structures, except P , belong to LCS(G; ¿). Finally, all nonsymmetric coalition structures P such that @ S 2 P with V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ) belong to
LCS(G; ¿).
We compare now the outcomes obtained under the largest consistent set (and the largest cautious consistent set) with those obtained under a sequential game of coalition formation with …xed payo¤ division proposed by Bloch (1996) . A …xed protocol is assumed and the sequential game proceeds as follows. Player 1 proposes the formation of a coalition The game goes on until the sequence (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; :::) satis…es P j s j = jNj. For symmetric valuations, if the …nite procedure yields as subgame perfect equilibrium a coalition structure with the property that payo¤s are decreasing in the order in which coalitions are formed, then this coalition structure is supported by the (generically) unique symmetric stationary perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of the sequential game (see Bloch, 1996) . This result makes easy the characterization of the SSPE outcome of the cartel formation game. Intuitively, in the sequential game, …rms commit to stay out of the cartel until the number of remaining …rms equals the minimal pro…table cartel size (this is the smallest coalition size for which a coalition member obtains a higher payo¤ than if all coalitions are singletons, and is equal to jS ¤ j). From Proposition 4 and Lemma 4, the relationship between the largest consistent set LCS(G; ¿) and SSPE follows straightforwardly.
Proposition 5
In the cartel formation game under Cournot competition with jNj · 10, the coalition structures supported by any symmetric stationary perfect equilibria (SSPE) of Bloch's sequential game always belong to the largest consistent set LCS(G; ¿).
Assume now that each player belonging to a coalition S have to support a monitoring or congestion cost c(S) which is increasing with the coalition size and has the following functional form. 4 For all S µ N , c (S) = c ¢ (jS ¡ 1j)
Á for jSj > 1 and c(S) = 0 for jSj = 1, with c; Á > 0. For c = 0, the monitoring is said to be costless. For c > 0, the monitoring is said to be costly. As a result, the per-member expected payo¤ in a cartel of size jSj becomes for all …rms belonging to S,
It should be noted that, once a monitoring cost is introduced, the valuation still satis…es the properties of positive spillovers, negative association and individual free-riding. However, the grand coalition may be ine¢cient. Example 4 illustrates that a monitoring cost may re…ne the largest consistent set and single out the grand coalition. Applying the iterative procedure to Example 4, we obtain that the largest consistent set LCS(G; ¿) which is ff6gg. The sum of the payo¤s associated to coalition structure f6g is :192. We observe that the welfare (de…ned as the sum of the payo¤s) is greater than the one associated to some stable coalition structures when monitoring is costless.
That is, costly monitoring might re…ne the largest consistent set as well as improving the welfare.
In Table 1 
Conclusion
We have adopted the largest consistent set due to Chwe (1994) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable in coalition formation games with positive spillovers. We have also introduced a re…nement, the largest cautious consistent set. For games satisfying the properties of positive spillovers, negative association, individual free-riding incentives and e¢ciency of the grand coalition, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the e¢cient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part 1: jNj · 4. Simple computations show that each non-symmetric coalition structure P 2 P is such that there exists S 2 P with V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P ). From Proposition 1,
we have LCS(G; ¿) = fP ¤ g for jN j · 4. Part 2: 5 · jN j · 10. From Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposition 2, we have fP 2 P : 9S 2 P such that V (S; P ) < V (S 0 ; P )g = 2 LCS(G; ¿), P = 2 LCS(G; ¿) and P ¤ 2 LCS(G; ¿), respectively.
To prove that fP 2 P : P 6 = P ; P ¤ and V (S; P )¸V (S 0 ; P ) for all S 2 P g ½ LCS(G; ¿), we have to show that all possible deviations from P can be deterred. Two kinds of possible deviations that bene…t the deviating players have to be considered.
Firstly, we consider the splitting deviations P ! S P 0 such that jP 0 j > jP j. The condition (P.1) implies that the players in N nS are worse o¤ in P 0 . Then, conditions (P.1) and (P.3) imply that further splitting deviations of players in N nS can occur and lead to some P 00 where P 00 ! N P and V (¢; P 00 ) < V (¢; P ) for all i 2 N. Therefore, P 0 ¿ P and the deviation P ! S P 0 is deterred.
Secondly, we consider the enlarging deviations P ! S P 0 such that jP 0 j < jP j and V (S; P 0 ) > V (¢; P ) for all i 2 S. Then, P 0 > P . Notice that by (P.1)-(P.4) and the payo¤ structure in the cartel formation game (Expression 1) we have P 0 > P if and only if jP 0 j < jP j and both coalition structures P and P 0 are symmetric. Then, the coalition S which moves from P to P 0 is S = N. Two cases should be distinguished:
(i) P 0 = P ¤ . Take the deviation P ¤ ! fig P 00 where player i deviates to form a singleton with P 00 > P 0 . It can be shown that V (¢; P 00 ) < V (¢; P ) for some i 2 S (the initial deviating coalition) and V (¢; P 00 )¸V (S 0 ; P ) for all S 00 2 P 00 . Then, the deviation P ! N P ¤ is deterred. From Expression 1 we get, for S 00 2 P 00 such that jS (ii)P 0 6 = P ¤ (i.e. all players deviate from P to another symmetric coalition structure P 0 , with P 0 6 = P ¤ ). From P 0 a player i deviates to form a singleton. That is, P 0 ! fig P 00 . From P 00 , take the sequence of moves where, at each move, one of the players belonging to the biggest coalition in size, deviates to form a singleton until we arrive to P . From P occurs the deviation of coalition N n fig to the coalition structure P 000 with P 000 = fN n fig; figg and such that P 000 À P 0 . As before, it is immediate to see that V (fN n figg; P 000 ) < V (¢; P ) for some player i 2 N (the initial deviating coalition) whenever P is symmetric. So, the deviation P ! N P 0 (with P and P 0 symmetric) is deterred.
Therefore, the enlarging deviations P ! S P 0 are deterred.
